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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
MRS. EDWARD WILSON, : 
Plaintiff and Appellant : 
-vs- : Case No. 14317 
FAMILY SERVICES : 
DIVISION, REGION II, 
. • • • • • 
Defendant and Respondent 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM A FINAL ORDER OF THE SECOND 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR WEBER COUNTY 
HONORABLE CALVIN GOULD, DISTRICT JUDGE 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a Final Order of the Second 
Judicial District Court in and for Weber County State of Utah, 
the Honorable Calvin Gould, District Judge. The order of the 
court denied Plaintiff's application for a Temporary Restraining 
Order until a hearing could be held upon Plaintiff's application 
for adoption of one Stephen Lacy. 
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1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Hearing upon Plaintifffs Order to Show Cause why a 
Temporary Restraining Order delaying placement of Stephen Lacy 
until hearings could be held upon Plaintiff's petition was held 
on August 12, 1975, at which time the court took the matter under 
advisement thereafter ordering on October 1, 1975, that Plaintiffs' 
application for a Temporary Restraining Order be denied. 
Plaintiff filed its Notice of Appeal, and the case is now before 
this Honorable Court pursuant to that Notice of Appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent asks that the judgment of the lower court 
be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Respondent agrees with the Appellant's Statement of the 
Facts with the exception that Respondent specifically denies 
placing the child in violation of the restraining order, inas-
much as the placement had been accomplished several weeks prior 
to the granting of the restraining order. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SINCE APPELLANT HAS NO LEGAL RIGHT 
(IS NOT ENTITLED BY STATUTE OR JUDICIAL 
DECISION) TO RECEIVE THE CHILD FOR PLACE-
MENT OR ADOPTION, APPELLANT HAS NOT BEEN 
DEPRIVED OF LIFE, LIBERTY OR PROPERTY AND 
IS NOT ENTITLED TO A HEARING. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The United States Supreme Court has expanded the de-
finition of property in the due process clause of the United 
States Constitution to include statutory entitlements such as 
welfare benefits that do not fit within the common law defini-
tion of property. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 US 254, 90 S. Ct. 1011. 
The United States Supreme Court has not expanded the definition 
of property to include anything to which the law has not entitled 
the persons it governs. 
Once an adoption agency has received custody for place-
ment and adoption of a child it has the sole responsibility and 
authority to place the child in a home that can satisfy its> 
needs. This is an important and necessary authority to keep 
the child's past from haunting it, destroying the stability of 
its1 new home, and defeating many of the purposes of placement 
and adoption. 
The grandparents have no rights beyond that of any other 
third person once the placement agency has obtained custody for 
adoption. State ex. rel. Juv. Dept. of Multnomah County v. 
Hayes, 16 Or. App. 438, 519 P. 2d 104 (1974). They are entitled 
to apply for placement custody and may make excellent foster 
parents or adoptive parents. But quite often they are not able 
to provide a proper home life for the child even though they love 
the child very much. They may always be a reminder to the child 
-3~ 
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he has been adopted. They may not have the strength or vitality 
to care adequately for the child. The natural parents can easily 
find the child again by finding the grandparents and can cause 
strife, contention and instability in the child's new home. 
These reasons support the rule that grandparents have no greater 
right to custody or adoption than other third persons. As with 
other applicants, the application of a grandparent is considered 
on its own merits in determining the best home for placement. 
Since Appellant was able to submit an application and 
have that application reviewed and considered in depth, she has 
been granted everything to which she is legally entitled. The 
decision to place the child in another home did not deprive 
Appellant of anything to which she was entitled. Even the most 
recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States have 
not stretched the definitions of life, liberty and property to 
include as much as Appellant requests. The Appellant is not 
entitled to more than she received so no hearing is required to 
satisfy the demands of the due process clauses of the United 
States Constitution. 
For the reasons cited in this argument, Appellant does 
not even have standing to prosecute this appeal. In re Cooper, 
17 Utah 2d 296, Concurring opinion at 299. 
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POINT II 
APPELLANT RECEIVED AN OPPORTUNITY TO 
BE HEARD AT THE TIME THAT THE JUVENILE 
COURT GRANTED CUSTODY OF THE CHILD FOR 
ADOPTION TO THE DIVISION OF FAMILY SERVICES 
SO THAT DUE PROCESS HAS BEEN SATISFIED. 
;.'.:'.• When a Juvenile Court grants custody of a child for 
adoption to the Division of Family Services all previous rights 
to the child are cut off and parents are permanently deprived. 
Deveraux v. Brown 2 Utah 2d 334, 273 P. 2d 185 (1954). In re 
K B 7 Utah 2d 398, 326 P 2d 395 (1958). Because of 
this, the Division of Family Services is then free to place the 
child in a stable home and protect the new home environment from 
the past. The child can grow up without the divisive influence 
that can come from even well-intentioned natural relatives. If 
the Division of Family Services had any less authority or if the 
relatives of the child maintained any greater rights the child 
could suffer terribly and all society would be the victim. 
Since it is at the moment of this deprivation hearing 
that all natural relatives lose whatever rights or access they 
may have to the child this is the appropriate moment for them to 
assert their claims. Since Appellant either did not avail herself 
of this opportunity or did and received a fair hearing, her re-
quest has been satisfied. 
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Due process entitles appellant to no more even under 
Goldberg v. Kelly, supra/ than a fair opportunity to be heard. 
Appellant is entitled to no more. 
POINT III 
SINCE APPELLANT WILL BE ABLE TO 
RECEIVE A COMPLETE HEARING WHEN THE 
ADOPTION PETITION IS PRESENTED, THE 
PROCESS OF SELECTING A PROPER FAMILY 
IN WHICH TO PLACE THE CHILD PROVIDED 
A SUFFICIENT PRE-DETERMINATION HEARING 
. TO SATISFY THE DEMANDS OF DUE PROCESS. 
Goldberg v. Kelly, supra., and subsequent United States 
Supreme Court decisions do not set any absolute requirements for 
administrative hearings but establish a balancing test to deter-
mine how much of a pre~determination hearing is required in any 
given situation when there will be opportunity for a complete 
post determination hearing. The Goldberg test is to balance the 
; private interest that is to be deprived against the governmental 
function and interest that require expeditious action. The 
governmental function may outweigh so heavily the private interest 
that the test would allow deprivation without a pre-determination 
hearing as long as a complete post-determination hearing is 
available. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1968). 
In the present situation the private interest is ap-
pellant's desire to adopt the child. As indicated in Point I 
above, there is no legal compulsion to recognize this interest, 
though it may be a substantial personal desire. The governmental 
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function involved is the Division of Family Services' responsi-
bility to benefit society by meeting the best interests of the 
child through placing him in a suitable environment. 
The other interests on the governmental side of the 
balance are the child's interest in proper emotional development 
that will lead to a meaningful and fruitful life and the govern-
ment1 s interest in economic and efficient handling of placement 
and adoption. 
This court has often recognized the child's best interest 
and welfare as the principal overriding consideration in any 
custody or adoption proceeding. In re Cooper,, 17 Utah 2d 296, 
410 P. 2d. 475 (1966); In re Adoption of F . 26 Utah 2d 255/ 
488 P. 2d 130 (1971); In re Adoption of D , 122 Utah 525, 
252 P. 2d 223 (1953) ; Walton v., Coffman, 110 Utah 1, 169 P 2d 97 
(1946); Kurtz v. Christensen, 61 Utah 1, 209 P 340 (1922). The 
wisdom in this position has been supported not only by judicial 
decision but by the studies and writings of eminent psychologists. 
A recent group effort by two renowned child psychologists and a 
distinguished law professor resulted in the publication of Beyond 
th£ Best interests of the Child, (1973), which contains guidelines 
for courts and legislatures on child placement, it is the 
authors' firm contention that the best interests of the child are 
the best interests of society and should be heavily favored over 
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any competing adult interest. In their words, "This preference 
reflects more than our professional commitment. It is in society's 
best interests. Each time the cycle of grossly inadequate 
parent-child relationships is broken, society stands to gain a 
person capable of becoming an adequate parent for children of the 
future." •": 
One clear guideline that these authors set is the impera-
tive nature of continuity in the psychological parent-child re-
lationship. The child does not recognize natural blood ties but 
relies on the psychological parent who protects, nourishes and 
comforts it. This continuity is so important that these experts 
feel that the best interests of a child are served only if any 
placement is treated with the same sanctity as the original 
natural parent-child relationship. This should be severed only 
when there is the same compelling danger of injury to the child. 
They describe the general nature of harm that results from dis-
continuity to each age level of child. In fact, "such moves 
from the familiar to the unfamiliar cuase discomfort, distress and 
delays in the infant's orientation and adaptation within his 
surroundings" (p. 32). "When infants and young children find 
themselves abandoned by the parent, they not only suffer separa-
tion distress and anxiety but also setbacks in the quality of 
their next attachments, which will be less trustful. Where 
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continuity of such relationships is interrupted more than once, 
as happens due to multiple placements in the early years, the 
children's emotional attachments become increasingly shallow 
and indiscriminate. They tend to grow up as persons who lack 
warmth in their contacts with fellow beings." (p. 33). Multiple 
placement of school age children11—-puts many children beyond the 
reach of educational influence, and becomes the direct cause of 
behavior which the schools experience as disrupting and the 
courts label so dissocial, delinquent, or even criminal." (p. 34). 
(See also Infants Without Families; Reports on the Hampstead 
Nurseries, The Writings of Ann Freud, Volume III New York; 
International Universities Press, 1973). 
"Adults who as children suffered from disruptions of con-
tinuity may themselves...treat their children as they themselves 
were treated-continuing a cycle costly for both a new generation 
of children as well as for society itself." (p. 34). 
These experts in child psychology also feel very strongly 
that placement decisions should reflect the child's sense of. time, 
as an integral part of the continuity concept, (p. 40). Absences 
of a psychological parent for what the child regards as an ex-
tended period of time will bring the same detrimental consequences 
as multiple placements, (p. 41). For an infant, a few days may be 
overwhelming (p. 40). For a child under the age of five, absence 
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of parents for more than two months is beyond comprehension, 
(p. 41) . The replacement however ideal, may not be able to heal 
completely, without emotional scarring, the injury sustained by 
the loss." (p. 41). 
These child psychologists recommend strongly that 
placement decisions be treated as an emergency, (p. 43) that it 
is more important to place the child unconditionally with a 
suitable family rather than delay the beginning and development 
of a proper relationship, (p. 42, 43, 45). It is a fairly rapid 
process for qualified authorities to determine whether or.not a 
parent or set of parents will probably be able to develop a 
proper relationship with the prospective parents according to 
these authors. To achieve more certainty will require an ex-
tended period of time which will probably cause more damage than 
it will prevent, (p. 51). 
When an applicant files for adoption in Utah his home is 
visited and the prospective parents are interviewed by caseworkers 
to determine the homefs suitability for placement with a special 
concern for interpersonal relationships, which are a difficult 
thing to quantify, examine as evidence or argue in court, but 
which are the very factors that most needs to be considered for 
suitable placement. The application and the caseworkers1 reports 
are then examined in a meeting of ten to twenty qualified people 
-10-
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including psychiatrists and psychologists to determine if the 
home is suitable for any child placement. Then the application 
is returned to the home county in which the prospective parents 
live and is considered by the caseworkers in that county with 
regard to the most suitable or most obviously suitable home for 
placement. The child's best interest is the measuring stick be-
cause, as mentioned above, that will most probably be the best 
interest of society as a whole. There may be several more visits 
by one or more caseworkers to the home before the caseworkers 
feel confident about the placement. 
To allow all interested applicants to have a complete 
evidentiary hearing or to have custody of the child for a six-
month period could cause tremendous damage to a child. Older 
brothers and sisters, aunts and uncles, and close friends, as 
interested third parties would all be able to demand these 
opportunities. The continuity necessary for the child's emotional 
health would be totally destroyed. Conceivably there could be no 
end of third-parties without legal entitlement who would claim 
an interest and demand a six-month trial custody period. 
In what the experts regard as an emergency situation, 
considering 1) the importance of expeditious proceedings to the 
child and as a result to society, 2) the difficulty of examining 
the crucial evidence in a full blown evidentiary hearing, and 
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I 
3) the extensive investigation and hearing that preceeds deter-.'. 
ruination it would seem clear that the present pre-determination 
hearing satisfies the demands of equal protection established 
under Goldberg v, Kelly, supra. Appellant will have an opportunity 
for a more than adequate post-determination hearing when there is 
a petition for adoption, 
POINT IV 
SINCE IT IS A PROPER AND LAWFUL 
PURPOSE TO PLACE THE CHILD FOR ADOPTION 
WITH A SUITABLE FAMILY AND IT IS REASON-
ABLE TO LIMIT PLACEMENT TO ONE SUITABLE 
FAMILY, AND SINCE APPELLANT HAS BEEN 
TREATED EQUALLY WITH ALL OTHER DIS-
APPOINTED APPLICANTS, THERE HAS BEEN 
NO DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION. 
Both the Utah and the United States constitutions guaran-
tee equal protection under the law, U.S. Const. Am. V, XIV; Utah 
Con. Article I, Sec. 2. This has been held by this court to 
mean that..."different treatment of different individuals does 
not necessarily violate the equal protection of the laws assur-
ances. They may be treated differently by the law or by legal 
procedures which divides them into classifications, if the classi-
fications have a reasonable relationship to a proper and lawful 
purpose, and if all persons within the same class are treated 
equally." Child v. City of Spanish Fork, Utah , 538 P. 2d 
184, 187 (1975); Hansen v. Public Employees Retirement System 
-12-
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Bd. of Adm., 122 Utah 44, 246 P 2d 591, 117 A.L.R. 330 (1938). 
The United States Supreme Court is in agreement. 
The two classes to which Appellant belonged are that of 
being an applicant and that of being a disappointed applicant 
for custody for adoption. As an applicant, there is no indica-
tion that Appellant received less consideration than other 
applicants under the placement procedure. Since only one person 
can receive custody at a time, the decision to place the child 
was reasonably related to Appellant's next classification, that 
of disappointed applicant. There is no indication that Appellant 
received different treatment from the other disappointed ap-
plicants. That the legal procedure of adoption works to maintain 
a permanent relationship between the child and the family with 
which the child is placed is reasonable because the continuity 
and stability of this arrangement will achieve the lawful purpose 
of helping the child achieve a proper orientation to life, as 
mentioned .in' Point III.. This purpose is reasonably related 
to not allowing disappointed applicants apply for adoption when 
the family with which the child has been placed can provide a 
suitable parent-child relationship. 
Since this purpose is proper and reasonably related to 
the classification of successful and disappointed applicants, 
.-13-
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< 
and since there is no indication that members of Appellant's 
class were treated unequally, there has been no denial of equal 
protection. 
POINT V 
THE LOWER COURT WAS CORRECT IN 
NOT GRANTING AN INJUNCTION SINCE 
IRREPARABLE INJURY COULD HAVE BEEN 
DONE IF PLACEMENT WERE NOT ALLOWED 
AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE. 
Rule 65 A(e) sets forth the grounds on which an injunc-
tion may be granted. All of these grounds are based on princi-
ples of equity as Rule 65 A(e) (4) implies, "An injunction may 
be granted....(4) In all other cases where an injunction would 
be proper in equity.11 This court has held that inequity pro-
ceedings "...it is the established rule that we will not disturb 
the findings and determination made unless they are clearly a-
gainst the weight of evidence or the court has abused its 
discretion." In re K B , 7 Utah 2d 398, 326 P 2d 395, 397 
(1958), Morley v. Willden, 120 Utah 423, 255 P 2d 500 (1951). 
As discussed in Point III above, the equities of the 
situation weighed so heavily against delaying placement of the 
child that the injunction would have been totally inequitable. 
There were therefore, no grounds on which to grant an injunction. 
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CONCLUSION ' 
The single great interest in the instant situation is 
the well being of the child, especially since society will 
receive the fruit, either good or bad, during the child's later 
years. All of Appellant's requests, though probably motivated 
from love, might undermine the well-being of the very individual 
that placement and adoption are designed to protect. 
In each instance the law acted properly to protect the 
child's interest. Appellant received an adequate opportunity 
for hearing and therefore due process of law, even though being 
deprived of nothing which is protected in the due process clauses, 
both at the time of the deprivation hearing when Respondent re-
ceived custody for adoption and during the process of application 
for placement, especially since there will be another full hear-
ing when there is a petition for adoption. Equal protection was 
not denied Appellant since the law acted to achieve a legal and 
proper purpose which was reasonably related to the classification 
it created and since the members of each class were treated 
equally. Appellant was deprived of nothing to which she was 
legally entitled and she has no standing to prosecute this appeal. 
Appellant's plea for injunction was properly denied 
since the equities of the situation weighed heavily in favor of 
placing the child promptly to limit the emotional deprivation to 
the child. 
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Therefore, this court should affirm the judgment of 
the lower court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
PAUL M. TINKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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